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Abstract
Since the collapse of Bretton Woods regime in 1970s, the growth of foreign exchange 
transactions have become overrun. Numerous amount of money has been invested on foreign 
currency speculative trade. However, such high level of speculation has caused market volatil-
ity and turned into one of the igniter of global economic crises. A Nobel Prize economist, 
James Tobin, then generated the conceptual regime to tax each speculative foreign transaction. 
This paper will not only provide the background of foreign transactions and the speculation but 
also illustrate pros and cons of “Tobin Tax” system including the analysis of its plausible imple-
mentation.
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INTRODUCTION
After the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods system in 1973, foreign exchange
transactions have tremendously proliferated.
Every day, approximately U.S. $1.2 trillion is
currently merchandised on the global foreign
currency market.1  Warnings from many crit-
ics assert that an unacceptable level of mar-
ket volatility resulted from chaotic specula-
tion in the currency markets is one of the most
influential factors which caused serious eco-
nomic problems.2
Measure of Taxing 1% on each foreign
exchange transactions was initially proposed
in 1972 by James Tobin, an American econo-
mist, which is later globally recognized as
“Tobin tax”. He believed that this compul-
sory measure would at least temporize the
monetary volatility that prevails financial mar-
kets at present. In the last twenty-five years,
the debate over suitability and feasibility to
implement Tobin Tax has been elevated by
various policy makers and economists. The
attraction of Tobin Tax is considerably in-
creased, thanks to many recent and remark-
able aftermaths such as European Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM) crises, the Mexican
peso devaluation, and the Asian currency cri-
sis. It is also viewed as a tool to reduce mar-
ket volatility and strengthen the executive
power of national government on supervising
its domestic economy.
This paper will begin providing the back-
ground of foreign exchange transaction and
how currency speculation occurs. Then there
will be some discussion about the Tobin Tax
regime including its advantages and draw-
backs. Finally, the implementation of Tobin
Tax will be analyzed.
BACKGROUND OF FOREIGN EX-
CHANGE TRANSACTION
In history, the primary value of money was
tied with basic form of valuable object like
gold. The risk of transaction costs and secu-
rity of using valuable materials as instrument
of trade influenced individuals to create pa-
per note as a substitutable way for transac-
tion.3  Since they were used as promissory
notes to pay the bearer a fixed amount on
presentation, actual value was not necessary
for these pieces of paper. Private bankers
were among the first group who issued such
notes. Later, the paper issuance was followed
by public sectors.4  From time to time, note
issuers began to attach these notes to a fixed
amount of gold which is also known as “mint
parity”.5  For example, during the Bretton
Woods system, one thirty-fifth of an ounce of
gold was set as equivalent to one U.S. dollar,
by U.S. government.6  Due to this policy, U.S.
government would trade one thirty-fifth of an
ounce of gold with anyone who held a dollar
bill. This system of exchanging paper bill for
gold is also known as the “gold system”.7
The modern gold standard is aged for al-
most two hundred years since the United
Kingdom started implementing actual gold
standard in the eighteenth century. The com-
mencement of fixed foreign exchange rates
was labeled by the gold standard. Because
of the equality between exchange rate of each
currencies and the ratio of their mint parities,
the exchange rates of currencies on the gold
standard had been fixed with other gold stan-
dard currencies.8  Therefore, fixed exchange
rates were created as a natural result of gold
convertibility. When the First World War
emerged, most countries suspended the deal-
ing in foreign money on their currencies and
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thus ceased the gold standard ideology.9
In the middle of the World War I interval,
not only the policy on imposing large repara-
tion payments on Germany had been dis-
cussed, there was also an agreement among
Allied powers on the framework of the post-
war international economic system. They con-
curred with the notion of “competitive devalu-
ation” by imposing highly restrictive tariffs to
bar foreign imports and international engage-
ments. As a consequence of these coercive
policies, the international trade and monetary
system collapsed and scaled down world
trade for sixty percent between 1929 and
1932. Because of the breakdown of the in-
ternational economic order and political in-
stability as domino effect, the conservative
extremist groups took an advantage of public
tension arisen from economic and political
vulnerability as a radical campaign to attack
the existing capitalistic dominion.10
Hence, after the Second World War, the
Allied powers comprehended together that
coercive economic policy that was arranged
in the repercussion of the First World War
was an administrative failure. The close rela-
tion between economic instability that impelled
the rise of fascism and the occurrence of World
War II was believed to be substantive origin
of the chaotic conflict among nations. When
the war nearly ended in 1944, forty-four Al-
lied countries appointed the delegates to at-
tend the conference arranged in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire with the purpose
of establishing a post-war economic regime.
The foundation of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank), and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was the conclusion of such assembly.11
Currently, 187 countries have joined the
IMF as member nations in the organization.
IMF’s mission includes promoting global
monetary cooperation, ensuring financial sta-
bility, facilitate international trade, promote
high employment and sustainable economic
growth, and reduce poverty.12  The IMF’s
General Reserve Account (GRA) is estab-
lished for collecting a subscription of gold and
currency paid by each member.13  The rela-
tive economic status of each member coun-
try will designate their subscription rates.
Therefore, the GRA got more financial sub-
sidy from affluent countries than from indi-
gent ones. Then, voting rights were allocated
to each member states in accordance with
their amount subscriptions. In addition, eligi-
bility for IMF loans and allowance for bor-
rowing from IMF were the obtainable privi-
leges which the enrolling countries could en-
joy if they wanted to advantage their short-
term reserve deficits when their treasury con-
tained insufficient amount of U.S. dollar, caus-
ing failure to keep their currency at its pegged
exchange rate.14
Bretton Woods system at that time relied
on the U.S. dollar as its main instrument. An
agreement among member states on estab-
lishment of a par value for their currency con-
nected to the U.S. dollar was made. They
also created a commitment to hold their cur-
rency exchange rate within 1% of the par
value.15
It was around twenty five years that ex-
change rate remained stable due to the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates. Nev-
ertheless, the downfall of the economic sta-
tus of the United States created uncertainty
on the system among member states. Ulti-
mately, in 1971, representatives from the
powerful economic regions considered the
proposal of restoring fixed currency parities.
The Smithsonian Agreement was then con-
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cluded as an equipment to respond to such
purpose. By virtue of the Agreement, it did
not only depreciate the U.S. dollars by 10%
but, by increasing the bandwidth of the float-
ing rates, it also allowed currency to float from
1% to 2.25%. The Smithsonian Agreement
was not deemed to be a long-termed strate-
gic plan but it was never renovated. One and
a half year later, speculators attacked the U.S.
dollar, and even 10% devaluation was not
enough to maintain its reasonable range.16
Therefore, many countries began to launch
free floating currency regime. By 1973, free-
floating format conquered all main currencies,
thus resulting in the collapse of the fixed ex-
change rates, the mainstay of the Bretton
Woods system.
Presently, almost all the major currencies
applied free floating system to their curren-
cies whose value is designated neither by gov-
ernments nor an international organization but
by the market17.  The value of a currency in-
volving other currencies is raised by increase
of demand for that currency. On the contrary,
a currency is devalued when demand for that
currency declines. In brief, “a floating exchange
rate is determined by the private market
through supply and demand”.18  Trade and
investment are among the most influential fac-
tors that can illustrate the supply and demand
for a state’s currencies.19
Consequently, the noticeable growth of
the demand for a nation’s currency will exist
when goods and investments from that coun-
try are increasingly in demand, causing the
accretion of demand for that country’s cur-
rency. An increase in the value of that nation’s
currency compared to other currencies is an
outcome of such incidence. However, uncer-
tainty still dominates this principle especially
in the area of short run foreign currency mar-
ket. It is very difficult to forecast or explain
exchange rate fluctuations, due to many fac-
tors, which are also known as “market dis-
tortion”.20
The scale of speculative transactions
which has become more widespread since
the floating rate system plays a major role in
the world monetary system affects the dis-
tortion of the foreign currencies market.  In a
floating rate system, investors can simply bet
on the market in the short run because the
value of currencies is constantly changing.21
Global currency transactions trade is mas-
sively inflated due to this type of speculation.22
Statically, after the Bretton Woods system has
reached its downfall, which ends the fixed
rate system era, there is significant growth of
merchantability of foreign currency exchange
transaction as mentioned above. $1.23 tril-
lion is estimated to be the value of transac-
tions which are traded per day.23
Moreover, eighty-two percents of these
transactions, according to the Federal Re-
serve, are not used to finance international
trade and investments; instead, they are mainly
used for speculation. In addition, an assess-
ment from the Bank for International Settle-
ments illustrates the domination of
“roundtrips” over the majority of these trans-
actions.24  Roundtrips denote a transaction in
which a holder of one currency sells it for
another, and then later resells that new cur-
rency for an equivalent amount of the old.  This
high amount of short, round-trip transaction
suggests that many transactions are specula-
tive in general.25
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PROBLEMS CONCERNING SPECU-
LATIVE TRANSACTIONS
“Speculative bubbles” is the theory as-
serted by some economic scholars in order
to explain the distorted market rate with ba-
sic economic essentials.26  Expectation of cur-
rency traders will control the value of a cur-
rency in a speculative bubble. If currency trad-
ers expect higher price of a currency, the value
of such currency will increase. However, the
true value of a currency will become more
illusive as price of such currency keeps ris-
ing. The bubble can overwhelm a currency
when a speculative bubble commences. Un-
der this circumstance, traders’ aspects tend
to be against selling the currency they are
possessing although they know that a currency
is overvalued. This is because of their expec-
tation for selling it at higher price in future.27
The psychological trend among the traders is
that demand for the currency will remain ris-
ing and its value is going to be worth more.
Then, although they are literally independent
to make their choices, they assume that if they
have an attempt to go for other alternative
decisions, they will suffer from loss of money.
Therefore, when numbers of investors are
cemented in these speculative bubbles, the
market itself must face difficulty for going back
to the right track because most traders can-
not resist the market trend.28
Market volatility is the crucial result of
this “bubbles”. The dramatic increase of ex-
change rate volatility due to the domination
of floating system29 has been featured by some
commentators as “excessively volatile”. It was
almost impossible for any scholars in the
1950s and 1960s to expect the level of such
enormous fluctuation in the value of curren-
cies being traded during past few decades.
One of the most worrying aspects of this vola-
tility is that these fluctuations seemingly have
no basis in market fundamentals.30
Market instability and difficulty of design-
ing economic plan are the instant outcome of
this volatility due to the unpredictability of main
future exchange rate. Generally, for investors
who hold foreign assets and liabilities, pre-
dictable exchange rates are necessary for
them in order that they can participate in prof-
itable economic planning.  For example, sup-
pose a Japanese car manufacturer, who
wanted to invest in U.S., does not know what
the yen to dollar exchange rate will be in six
months, much less in six years, it is very diffi-
cult to expect the success of the investment in
an American manufacturing plant.31  In addi-
tion, risk of foreign exchange resulted from
volatile markets can cause diversion of re-
source usage; far remote from production to
hedging instruments. It also bars any business
entities from getting together in a productive
venture.32
Volatile exchange rates can dangerously
affect the entire economies including on a
macroeconomic level. In 1994, Paul Volker,
the chairperson of the Bretton Woods Com-
mission, stated the following remark in its re-
port:
“Since the early 1970s, long-term
growth in the major industrial coun-
tries has been cut in half, from about
5 percent to 2.5 percent a year. Al-
though many factors contributed to
this decline in different countries at
different times, low growth has been
an international problem, and the loss
of exchange rate discipline has played
a part”.33
Moreover, wide spreading currency cri-
ses can be stimulated by volatility in the glo-
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bal currency markets. A financial market which
is indubitably fluid and innovatively fluctuat-
ing can bring about “speculative onslaughts”.
According to some writers, this kind of
predatory investments committed by greedy
speculators shall be held responsible for sev-
eral financial crises. Instead of blaming a
country’s economic impotence as the root of
currency crises, some observers maintain that
“self-fulfilling” speculative attacks can be po-
tential sources of many crises. Therefore, al-
though a country’s economy is basically
healthy, once speculators monetarily assault
a currency of that country, it becomes the
market trend followed by others and launches
a real economic crisis.
One of the most prominent and notable
crises which can tangibly exemplify the peril
of currency speculative manipulation is when
the Thai Baht were under attack which ig-
nited the 1997 Asian Currency Crisis. The
unprepared encounter with the massive inva-
sion compulsorily pressured the Thai govern-
ment to depreciate the baht by eighteen per-
cent on July 2, 1997. Eventually, the crisis
rapidly and spreadingly overwhelmed across
Southeast Asia following the devaluation of
the baht in Thailand. The next casualty is the
Philippines where her peso was the next to
be under financial constraint and devaluation
of peso seemed to be the inevitable solution
for the Philippines as well. Afterward, the
Malaysian ringgit was the next target of cur-
rency speculators, where approximately U.S.
$1 billion was vainly spent by the central bank
to defend the ringgit prior to its fallen to a
thirty-three month low. Last but not least,
currency speculators turned their muzzle to
Indonesian rupiah. The rupiah was before-
hand permitted to float in limited range by
Indonesian central bank so as to foster cur-
rency stability. Nonetheless, overcome by
outer and inner pressure, Bank Indonesia
extended the controlled range from 8% to
12%, yet it failed to restrain the fall of rupiah.
In order to maintain stability of the currency,
1.4 billion U.S. $ was spent by the Indone-
sian central bank. Unfortunately, the attempt
to defend the currency became a total failure,
and later on August 14, 1997, Bank Indone-
sian removed the intervention bands and au-
thorized the rupiah to float without control.
As a result, its value had dropped at an addi-
tional 20% within a month. The speculative
attack also affected even countries with sturdy
economy such as Singapore and Hong Kong.
This critical situation opened the way for IMF
to activate the safeguards which was used to
be instituted after the Mexican currency cri-
sis in 1995. One of the most important ac-
tions was the GAB34. During such cumber-
some stage, 121 billion of U.S. $ had been
pledgingly credited to the Philippines, Thai-
land, Indonesian, and South Korea. Although
this IMF urgent allowance was claimed to be
a success, IMF was intensely criticized on its
defensive response to this economic crisis.35
In order to obtain a loan from IMF, a
concordance between a member country and
the IMF on a mandatory program of national
economic policy must be made.  IMF lend-
ing requires undertakings of certain policy
actions from a country as its commitments.
This is a design to secure that the resolve of
funds’ using will be maintained to untangle the
balance of payments problems. Doing these
would also lead to restoration and creation
of pathway to assistance from other financial
providers. Once the economic and financial
status of the country has returned to normal,
the repayment to IMF is made, making other
members available to the funds.36  In addi-
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tion, the grantee state is required to initiate
economic regulatory agenda that mainly fo-
cuses on budget cut and raise of tax and in-
terest rates, which is so-called “IMF Condi-
tionality”. Some scholars contend that these
kinds of burdensome programs do not facili-
tate the country as a whole; instead, the com-
mon citizens of the recipient countries are sub-
jected to suffer from these programs for the
recovery of a minority group of foreign in-
vestors. Particularly, their argument concen-
trates on the distorted conceptualization that
the grant of IMF bailouts tends to guard the
foreign investors against their risky loan, in-
stead of serving local people. This is because
the main theme of utilization of IMF funds of
borrowing countries is mainly to avoid de-
fault on loans, not to help their own citizens.
During post-Asian crisis, the idea of in-
ternational financial reformation has been
widely acknowledged. The scheme to “adapt
the international financial architecture to the
twenty-first century” has been mentioned by
U.S. president Bill Clinton and “a new Bretton
Woods for the new millennium” has become
a quote from British Prime Minister Tony
Blair. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the U.S.
Federal Reserve, has also pointed that change
is needed for the global financial system. A
number of authorities have even urged that
Bretton Woods-type system of fixed exchange
rates should be resurrected or that a global
central bank and a global currency should be
established. The indication of the need for the
international financial system reformation even
comes from the one who was believed to gain
tremendous benefit from the volatility of the
existent system, George Soros. However, al-
though the problems of the existing interna-
tional financial system are recognized and the
reformation of the regime seems to be con-
currently agreed to be implemented, the so-
lutions of such missions are still widely de-
batable.
THE TOBIN TAX AND ITS PURPOSES
In the 1970s, a notable monetary expert,
economist and Nobel Laureate, James Tobin,
suggested an idea of taxing on foreign ex-
change transactions with the following con-
cepts:
“1. The tax would be applied at a uni-
form ad valorem rate by, at the
least, all the key currency coun-
tries.
2. It would be administered and col-
lected by each government on all
payments by residents within its
jurisdiction that involved a spot
currency exchange, including, as
the case of Eurocurrency trans-
actions, exchange that do not in-
volve the home currency.
3. The proceeds from the tax would
be paid into a central fund con-
trol by the IMF or the World
Bank.
4. Subject perhaps to prior IMF
consent, countries could form cur-
rency areas within which the tax
would not apply. That is, small
countries that formally tied their
currency to a key currency would
not be required to levy the tax on
intra-area currency exchange.”37
The principal goal of Tobin Tax was that
speculative races on the major world curren-
cies, which were a partial cause of the down-
fall of Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate
system in the early 1970 and many crises af-
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ter, shall be discouraged. Tobin asserted that
the runs on speculation were negatively af-
fecting the world economy. Their impact ig-
nited the increase of the exchange rate vola-
tility among the key world currencies, which
inevitably became the hindrance of interna-
tional trade and obstructed the stream of for-
eign direct investment. More significantly,
Tobin stated that the effect of the runs could
deter the state authorities from enforcing poli-
cies, which aimed to benefit the whole soci-
ety by longer-term payoffs, without fearful
perception of sudden unfriendly backlashes
of the financial markets.38
To “throw some sand in the well-greased
wheels” of the global financial market mecha-
nism and to enhance the mitigation of the
domination of speculation over merchantabil-
ity, according to Tobin’s phrase, were the main
functions of the Tax. This would work be-
cause a one-percent transactions tax, as pre-
liminarily recommended by Tobin, would di-
rectly decrease the benefit which speculators
normally gain from currency speculation, due
to the involvement of “short-term financial
round-trip excursions into another currency”39
with the expectation of gain from each rapid
circulation generally an insignificant portion of
the majority of borrowed funds put in
progress.  On the other hand, monetary trans-
actions with higher or longer expectation of
profits and with more stability of investment,
such as trade of goods and services or for-
eign direct investment would not be much
impacted by the tax. More importantly, since
currency speculators were tied up with the
tax burden and less exchange volatility to be
taken advantage from, they would be vitally
defeated, while genuine commodity traders
and investors with long-range goal would en-
joy more trustable exchange rates as a trade-
off for their tax bite.40
TOBIN TAX ADOPTION AND ITS
EXPECTED ADVANTAGEOUS OUT-
COME
As initially framed by Tobin, 1% of tax
on every there-and-back currency transac-
tion shall be levied and the world financial
realm would be benefited. This would result
in, which is the most important, and the main
objective of the Tax, the declination of specu-
lative activity and the deterioration of currency
speculation, awakening the rise of foreign
exchange market stability.41
The reduction of currency speculation was
not the only one of the most plausible goals
of all the Tax’s purported benefits. Moreover,
since enforcement of the Tax levy requires
speculators, in order to remain profitable, to
pay additional rates for each of their bets.
Therefore, it will decrease the incentive of this
kind of high-return-gamble-alike investments
which used to frequently occur among specu-
lators. This phenomenon will then gradually
exile most speculators out of world financial
empire.42
To be more illustrative, the positive out-
come of the enforcement of the tax can be
exemplified. Suppose ten percent is an inter-
est rate of a given home country and 12
months is investment horizon of a given in-
vestor, while one percent is a Tobin Tax rate
that is imposed on each roundtrip transac-
tions. As a consequence, in order to make
the investment worthy, an investor will have
to gain an eleven percent (.11/.99) for recip-
rocation. Nevertheless, things would become
more obvious if the investment horizon were
decreased to 1/12 of the year or one month.
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As a result, in order to make the investment
profitable, investors’ compulsorily required
return for the investment would apparently
jump to twenty-two percent. Definitely, once
only one week (1/52 of the year), became
the period of investment horizon, the satis-
factory rate of return for our model oversea
investors would undoubtedly escalate to sixty-
two percent.  This concept demonstrates that
investors with repetitive volatile investing can
be heavily penalized at a stunning level by the
tax, even at the rates of 1% or less. Further-
more, according to this framework, if the levy
rate of the Tax was 0.1% with one day of
investment horizon, investing under such con-
dition would not be attractive for investors at
all unless their expectable yield was set at
46.5%. Thanks to the factual presumption
that, of all foreign transactions, eighty per-
cent is the amount of foreign exchange trans-
actions that occur in seven days or less, then
it is foreseeable that the balk of speculative
mobility could be seemingly diminished by
triggering of this short-term tax; even at the
humble rate of 0.1%. Theoretically speaking,
the efficiency of the Tax in diminishing specu-
lation and shortening the obese volatility of
the market could be upheld.43
The next empirical advantage of the Tobin
Tax, in addition, is that long-term investment
will not or scarcely be impacted by the Tax.
In consequence, as the delay of short-term
currency speculation trading portion is delib-
erately maximized, the operation of what has
been left in the market remains practically
untied from any distortion.44
There are other foreseeable betterments
of Tobin Tax. One of the most obvious en-
hancements is the potentiality to collect a con-
siderable amount of gain. Although the tax was
originally perceived by Tobin as a mechanism
to promote constructive stability in the cur-
rency market, the elemental byproduct of the
tax, its tax proceeds, is irresistibly adorable.
Not only the tax proceeds that become the
outgrowth, but also the international societ-
ies’ perception toward this highly disputatious
tax. Even though taxes are always consid-
ered by some analysts and scholars as inher-
ent unfavorable factors, there are groups of
experts who still insist that national policies of
developing countries desirably accept “rea-
sonable” taxes as their components. In addi-
tion, an amount of critics similarly maintain
that in the aspect of imposing taxes as incen-
tives for encouraging investment, the exist-
ence of domestic taxes will cause little or no
influence to the executive-level management
of the corporate entities whose long-term
projects are their favorite.45
THE CASE AGAINST TOBIN TAX
If every coin has two sides, Tobin Tax is
not the exception. Not different from other
collaborative international initiation, a num-
ber of developed nations, particularly the
United States, become the loudest opposi-
tions of the Tobin Tax. They oppose that im-
posing a tax on foreign transaction price will
deteriorate the incentive of investment. Tobin
Tax is also countered that it will cause nega-
tive impact on the foreign exchange market
itself. An example of this is that the tax may
possibly destabilize the economic balance by
getting stuck in the difficulty to differentiate
stable, longstanding financial transactions from
sloppy, short standing speculative transac-
tions. The argument that the tax will intervene
the market and makes it become less effi-
cient, is also asserted by some critics. Nev-
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ertheless, the pro-Tobin insists that the for-
eign exchange merchandise nowadays is not
stanchly constructive. Therefore, a develop-
ment of exchange rate stability would be ad-
vantageous for it, thanks to the aftermath of
the implementation of the Tobin Tax. An ex-
planation asserted by a commentator points
out that after implementation of the Tobin Tax,
the determination of exchange rates will still
be driven by the market. The role of the Tax
is only to increase the efficiency of the ex-
change rate determination.46
Another inevitable and problematic ob-
stacle is enforceability. Let’s assume that the
implementation of Tobin Tax was occurred
at an international forum, then which interna-
tional institutions should be responsible for
monitoring international currency transactions?
Capabilities of such organization to evaluate
and collect the tax, including its efficiency are
also still doubtful. In addition, due to domi-
nation of hi-technology in motivating the mar-
ket of foreign exchange transactions, an es-
tablishment of any innovative international
mechanisms or a renovation of a current one
would not be either facile or low-priced. Each
nation, on the other hand, may be able to
domestically establish or found the national
tax-collecting system and transfer the out-
comes to international level for further allo-
cation. With this gateway, however, there are
three radical confrontations to undertake.
First, since attracting investors, who are will-
ing to enjoy tax haven, is inescapable, coun-
tries will bear a weak encouragement to abide
by an international agreement regulating the
tax. Second, suppose countries do follow the
agreement, what international entity should be
accountable to obligate the countries’ burden
to accumulate tax proceeds and what should
be the facilitative procedure to do so? Finally,
spots where currency transactions are dealt
are always various, thus, worldwide enforce-
ment becomes a difficult or even impossible
mission.
International cooperation is also essen-
tial for implementation of Tobin Tax. This be-
comes another barrier that may occur along
the path of seeking for mutual agreement
among international community. The imposi-
tion of the tax on international currency trans-
actions requires universal agreements on the
terms and conditions of the tax. Since only a
few countries and currencies are forums and
mediums that most currency transactions are
transacted, the tax would paradoxically in-
duce countries to delay acceptation on any
international agreements enforcing it. In illus-
tration, if the adoption of an international
agreement on the Tobin Tax was widely ma-
terialized, most currency traders would tend
to be attracted by markets that refrained from
imposing the tax;   therefore, countries that
exempted themselves from the terms of the
agreement would be, ridiculously speaking,
rewarded.47
Problems regarding enforcement could
come up in case that a single agreement was
to be endorsed by all countries. In reality, the
trade of foreign exchange in most countries
of this world is already taken place on street
corners, in markets that are colored by vari-
ety of gray and black shades. For taxing at
minimal rates on large transactions, which is
the principle of Tobin tax, street corners would
not be much impacted.48
Some academicians have given advice
supporting the use of the automated systems
in brokering and in direct interdealer trading,
which are becoming more well-known. They
asserted that such usage could simplify the
tax collection. If the solution of problems of
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international agreement could be praticalized,
it is reasonable to think that enforcement
would be easier for financial transaction taxes
compared with an income tax.49
CASE STUDIES FROM COUNTRIES’
PRACTICES
The application of taxes and restrictions
on capital inflow and outflows, which con-
tains some of the features of Tobin Tax, was
implemented by several countries such as
some Latin American nations and East Asia.
The competency of taxes and manipulations
on stream of capital, from the perspective of
revenue-raising aptitude, has not been me-
thodically scrutinized. However, in the view-
point of currency instability, liberality of mac-
roeconomic policy and admissibility of the
exchange rate system, such measures have
made tangible outcomes, proven by evidence.
The Korean administrative has exercised such
actions to impose limitation on the flowing
activity of the won with purposes to prevent
destabilization of exchange sway caused by
Korean exporters and to block the accretion
of an undesirably bulky external debt load.
Chilean authorities have stipulated the limita-
tion on capital inflow to shield the economy
from destabilization which was sensitive to
arising markets. The influence from these
measures yielded the combined capital inflows
into multiple countries in Latin American.
Compared to the countries where such re-
strictions were not in place, the nations that
restrictively regulated their accessibility to for-
eign capital market were able to withstand
the “tequila shock”50 of early 1995 less rug-
gedly.
Japan has also possessed a prolonged
experience of securities transaction taxes
(有価証券取引税 ) since 1953.51  Adjustment has
been imposed many times on these taxes for
years. They mostly occurred together with the
imposition of arrangements on capital gains
taxation rates. An expert also analyzed the
aftermath of economic conditions affected by
the adjustments of stock transaction taxes in
various economies which include Japan as
well as Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan. In-
conclusiveness was generally bestowed in the
study which illustrated that “[o]n average, an
increase in tax rate reduces the stock price
but has no significant effect on market volatil-
ity and market turnover … Overall, the evi-
dence is not consistent with the hypothesis
that stock transaction tax can reduce noise
trading and volatility”. In brief, reduction of
market volatility does not appear to be effec-
tively achieved by adjusting transaction
costs.52
It is also discovered by other scholars that
the significant increase of tax revenues was
accomplished by Japanese security transac-
tion taxes, partly in short term… “the [tax]
generated 4.2% of government general ac-
count revenue in Japan in 1988.  However,
by 1993 this share fell back to 0.96% as most
of the speculative trading moved to the trad-
ing floors in much less-taxed locations”.53
In addition, when Japanese security
transaction taxes were reduced in 1989, the
impact of such reduction was studied by con-
ducting an analysis over the performance of
equities contained in the list of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange.  It revealed that “significant de-
creases in estimates of the first-order
autocorrelation in returns for Japanese stocks
listed in Japan, but no changes for Japanese
stocks dually listed in the United States as
American Depository Receipts (ADRs),
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which were not subject to the tax law change.
We also find lower price basis between the
ADRs and their underlying Japanese stocks.
These results are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that a reduction in transaction costs im-
proves the efficiency of the price discovery
process”.  The attribution of this outcome
leads to the fact that the activity and higher
speed rate of absorption of market data into
stock prices are boosted and facilitated by
reduced transaction costs.54
PLAUSIBLE AVENUES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF TOBIN TAX
Scholars and stakeholders remark some
approaches which are capable of implement-
ing Tobin Tax. One method would be to found
an international organization to support imple-
mentation and enforcement of the tax on in-
ternational arena. Most of currency transac-
tions which were subject to assessment of
Tobin normally occur within a limited number
of industrialized nations. Since stabilization of
the foreign exchange is the aim of the tax, its
outcome would stimulate the transfer of wealth
from restrictively enriched economies of in-
dustrialized countries to broader international
commonality for further function coping with
problems that become world agenda, such
as poverty. Consequently, using an interna-
tional organization as a tool to implement
Tobin Tax would enhance emblematical con-
sistency with the impact of the tax because it
would lead all countries to not only require-
ment of international correlations but also rep-
resentation of economic interdependence.55
Numerous avails could be boosted by this
approach. When homogeneous implementa-
tion would be harmoniously proceeded by an
international organization, as a result, it would
guarantee that each member nations would
be equally treated and potentialize the moti-
vation of many countries to cooperate more
in the implementation of the tax. Furthermore,
the broader well-founded organizational en-
forcement and dispute settlement instruments
could be utilized by an organization operating
under the supervisions of notable international
bodies, such as the United Nations or the
World Bank. Even though Tobin Tax apostles
traditionally appreciate this approach, its plau-
sibility to acquire approval and cooperation
from international community is inevitably un-
der impervious obstacle. Furthermore, not
only its failure to develop a solution for en-
forceability has increased the difficulty for
practicable implementation, it also demon-
strates the uncertainty of placing responsibil-
ity to specific organizations for unraveling the
enforceability hardship.
Another advisable approach, instead, fo-
cuses on administration of national tax sys-
tem to domestically implement the tax. This
track could be got through by innovatively
systemizing national taxation and banking re-
gime, tracing any financial transaction which
contains international linkage. Effective as-
sessment and collection would then become
the aftermath. Later, governmental procedure
shall be the mechanism for further contribu-
tion of the proceeds to international entities
whose mission is to productively manage the
fund. Convincingly, countries which mean to
participate in this coordination would be likely
to follow this path if they walk into the en-
trance of a multilateral agreement together with
other affiliating countries because unilateral
imposition of the tax could engage them into
a competitively disadvantageous situation.
Consequently, entering into a binding agree-
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ment by a country for imposing the tax on
herself would not likely be possible unless it
is assured by other countries that they will
also be impartially bound under the same
measures regarding the imposition of the tax
within their territorial foreign exchange trad-
ing arena. In addition, assessment and col-
lection of tax proceeds may be functioned in
various channels. For example, the final pro-
ceeds can be deducted in order to fulfill the
contribution to the international organization
“by the administrative costs incurred by the
national government in implementing the
tax”.56  Countries may possibly expose an
anxiety that, with an exclusion of a multilat-
eral agreement in which equal burdens bind
all of the parties, more favorable treatment
will be veiled on some countries than others.
Domesticalization of Tobin Tax implemen-
tation process also comprises of other ad-
vantages. Since implementing the tax regime
at domestic level mainly relies on institutional
mechanisms that are already established, such
approach would be more economical than
newly establishing of an international organi-
zation. This would also increase more effec-
tiveness as a result of making use of coun-
tries’ own existing expertise, knowledge and
other technical tools that they have already
become acquainted with.  For that reason,
manageability of assessment and collection of
the tax would be more convenient, leading to
the lower possibility rate of tax avoidance com-
mitted by investors who use derivative instru-
ments.  Moreover, requirement of the mutual
agreement on international level for the imple-
mentation of the tax will decisively become
unnecessary. However, although
practicalization of domestic formula maybe
more probable, some have raised an argu-
ment that practicing this approach will pose a
risk for the reason that governments, as a sole
implementer of the tax, may be reluctant to
grant the tax proceeds to international institu-
tions and tend to reserve the proceeds for
their own sake. In order to minimize such
riskiness, enforcement of a multilateral agree-
ment which includes provisions governing
administration of the tax and dispute settle-
ment might be inevitably essential.
No matter which approaches countries
choose to implement, participating in the mul-
tilateral agreements is compulsorily fundamen-
tal in which expression of definitive intention
would likely be made by the parties. The tax
imposer countries would be looking for con-
fidence from stakeholders such as interna-
tional institutions and other binding countries
regarding their obligatory fulfillment under the
agreement. On the other hand, international
organizations which participate in the tax sys-
tem would expect the obligations under the
agreement to be fulfilled by member coun-
tries. Therefore, as a result, all relevant stake-
holders which are participating countries and
international organizations would seek proper
use of the tax proceeds and appropriate dis-
tribution of the fund received by governments
and organizations. At the finish line, account-
able and enforceable propositions shall be
executed by parties to the obligatory multi-
lateral agreements. If the principal goal of the
multilateral agreements leads to an establish-
ment of an upper organization, responsible
for distribution of the tax proceeds, a sys-
tematic dispute settlement tool of such orga-
nization shall also be consorted in the agree-
ments.57
Epilogue
The formation of the conventional inter-
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national monetary regime was accidentally
heaped rather than deliberately enrooted. Its
flawlessness is widely and colossally ques-
tionable. Illustration of the international mon-
etary system which has been presented dur-
ing many crises has affirmed its vulnerability
to congenital instability and practice of mar-
ket falsification.58  Therefore, the renowned
proffer, Tobin Tax, was then proposed by a
well-known economist, James Tobin, to
stimulate the collection of tax on foreign cur-
rency transactions which he personified as
“throwing sand” in the wheel of international
finance59, with an aspiration to decelerate dis-
torting and craving transactions on the cur-
rency market committed by currency specu-
lators. Finally, although the Tobin Tax may
not be the healer-of-all of the global financial
difficulty, its ability to initialize the develop-
ment of more concrete global financial mar-
ket cannot be overlooked.
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